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ABSTRACT
The recent emergence of two separate 
outbreaks of two new viruses has generated 
renewed interest in the threat of pandemics. 
For a significant portion of the total fatalities 
associated with these infections the cause 
of death was due to an over-reaction of an 
infected body’s immune system. This research 
explores possible pharmaceutical interventions 
that would help expand the list of options 
public health could employ in a response. 
For inclusion in state stockpiles, medications 
must meet three specific criteria: medical 
efficacy, cost, and logistical considerations. 
We identified four medications that could 
be employed (three statins - atorvastatin, 
simvastatin, and gemfibrozil and an antiviral 
– ribavirin) and present options for their
inclusion into state stockpiles. Through this
research we have attempted to open a dialogue
with other federal and state planners as they
wrestle with the same challenges within their
home agencies.
INTRODUCTION
While the Ebola crisis in Africa has recently 
captured the media’s attention, influenza and 
other pandemic strain viruses remain by far the 
largest killer viruses facing the U.S.  Seasonal 
flu-associated deaths in the United States have 
ranged from about 3,000 per season to about 
49,000 per season.1 Over the span of fifteen 
years public health has witnessed a series of 
pandemic viruses.  In the late 1990s the world 
watched the emergence of the H5N1 avian 
influenza virus (that continues to smolder in 
Asia).  In 2003 the SARS coronavirus erupted 
out of southeast China.  And in 2009 the H1N1 
influenza pandemic emanated out of Mexico. 
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The recent emergence of two separate and 
concurrent outbreaks of two new viruses-- 
the H7N9 type-A influenza emanating from 
southeastern China and, the Middle Eastern 
Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus (MERS-
CoV) coming out of northeastern Saudi 
Arabia-- has generated renewed interest in 
the threat of pandemics.2  Science tells us that 
these naturally occurring pandemics are both 
normal, and to some extent, cyclical: it is not 
a matter of ‘if’ humanity will see some sort of 
pandemic strain viral pandemic, but ‘when.’3
Although the 1918 Influenza and 2003 SARS 
Outbreak are separated by eighty-five years 
and decades of medical advances, the biological 
processes that take the lives of those who 
succumb to either of these illnesses are quite 
similar. Each of these infections is an invasion of 
a novel virus into the human body’s respiratory 
system. For a significant portion of the total 
fatalities associated with each of these infections 
(some researchers have attributed as much as 
50%), the cause of death was often described 
as ‘viral pneumonia’ as opposed to traditional 
bacterial pneumonia. In the intervening years 
since the 1918 event, physicians have developed 
a term for this pathological process that puts 
extreme stress on the lungs: Acute Respiratory 
Distress Syndrome (ARDS). Almost unique 
to each of these illnesses, this syndrome is an 
over-reaction of an infected body’s immune 
system to contain and defeat an invading 
pathogen.4 For this reason, we will consider 
novel influenza and novel pandemic strain 
viruses together in this manuscript since they 
pose a similar treatment conundrum. 
Since the SARS outbreak in 2003, there 
has been a vast amount of research devoted 
to developing treatment strategies to combat 
ARDS. The literature on the effectiveness of 
these emerging treatment strategies is mixed 
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at best, but several of them may be useful for 
treating future novel viruses.  Many states have 
existing stockpiles of medications originating 
from the CDC release in preparation for the 
2009/2010 H1N1 epidemic.5  Stockpiles are a 
difficult question for states to tackle because 
they are often for illnesses that may not yet 
exist (e.g. a novel strain that has yet-to-mutate), 
they require a sizeable investment of resources 
upfront, and they require sizeable time/
effort/resources to properly maintain over 
long periods. While we do not address all of 
these state-specific fundamental issues, we do 
examine potentially useful options for a state 
wishing to supplement its existing stockpile of 
medications to provide some capabilities when 
confronting ARDS. This research is the first 
attempt to plan policy for this type of scenario.
Pandemics are of particular concern because 
disease is truly widespread, typically global, and 
frequently associated with a more virulent strain 
of virus (with the ensuing increase in fatality 
rates).  Even if one of these novel influenza or 
pandemic strain viruses is only affecting a single 
country or state, there is still concern because 
the treatments required may quickly overwhelm 
existing capabilities.  Depending on the ability 
to obtain supplies rapidly in an epidemic, it 
may become necessary to consider developing 
stockpiles.  While the private sector health  care 
system provides medical treatments, it is not 
required to maintain a stockpile of prescription 
medications or personal protective equipment. 
The private sector healthcare system may keep 
a few days’ worth of supplies, but functions 
under the assumption that it can be readily 
resupplied.  In case of a widespread disease, 
this assumption may no longer hold true, so 
the private sector healthcare system would 
suddenly need to rely on the state and federal 
public health resources to adequately resupply 
it with the needed medications and equipment. 
The United States has invested significant 
time/energy/resources in preparation for 
a large-scale biological event. One of these 
investments in biosecurity led to the U.S. 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 
(CDC) creating and maintaining its Division of
Strategic National Stockpile, which maintains a
“$3.5B portfolio of antibiotics, medical supplies,
antidotes, antitoxins, antivirals, vaccines, and 
other pharmaceuticals” in the strategic national 
stockpile (SNS).6   A large proportion of the 
SNS is comprised of antibiotics and antivirals, 
so from a planning perspective, state and local 
public health agencies would likely be able to 
provide medications needed to treat bacterial 
pneumonia cases.7  However it is unclear the 
extent to which those materials would be useful 
in countering the deadly effects of ARDS within 
patients during a pandemic.  In order to be better 
prepared, a state may choose to supplement 
its existing stockpile to include medications 
that may prove useful in combatting ARDS. 
There are many options in various stages of 
development for such a stockpile, and the issue 
is how to identify good candidate medications. 
In particular, a good candidate medication 
would be one that has the greatest chance of 
having medical efficacy with a novel pandemic 
strain virus, one that is affordable to procure, 
and one that can be stored in existing stockpile 
facilities.  Therefore, this paper will consider 
three specific criteria: medical efficacy, cost, 
and logistical considerations.  Medical efficacy 
is considered in Section 1, Review of Medical 
Treatment Options.  Cost, affordability, and 
logistical considerations are addressed in 
Section 2, Stockpile Considerations.  Logistical 
considerations are limited to being able to 
incorporate the medication into existing 
stockpile facilities.  Next, we estimate the 
approximate number of treatments (full courses 
of the medication) that would be required 
for the state and then determine the cost of 
this stockpile of medications using a widely 
available website. The State of Nevada is used 
as an example for these calculations, but other 
states can easily implement this methodology 
to obtain estimates for their situation. Next, 
the section explores what would be funding 
limits that could be considered as “affordable” 
by states.  Section 3 provides the results of 
limiting medically efficacious therapies by 
the affordability constraint and the logistical 
stockpile constraint to provide a set of potential 
therapies that a state could consider including 
in their stockpile.  Section 4 discusses the 
limitations of the analysis. The final section 
provides a discussion of possible options 
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available to states that decide to enhance and 
supplement their existing stockpiles to be able 
to combat ARDS.
Review of the Medical 
Treatment Options
The current body of knowledge surrounding 
potential treatment options for influenza and 
pandemic strain viruses appears to focus on two 
mechanisms to reduce disease in people who 
are severely ill: 1) limit virus replication in the 
host cell; and/or, 2) suppression of the body’s 
hyper-immune response to inhibit ARDS. The 
literature revealed five classes of drugs that 
have demonstrated an ability to either inhibit 
virus replication, or to suppress the immune 
system: 1) antivirals; 2) statins; 3) interferons; 
4) corticosteroids; and, 5) herbal/alternative 
medications.  In the following sections, we 
discuss how each of these medications can have 
a beneficial effect in treatment and we provide 
a summary of the extent of the experimentation 
with their use.  We do not consider potential 
side-effects as they are numerous, varied, and 
patient specific as to which will occur.
Antiviral Medications
When an invading virus approaches a possible 
host cell, it needs a ‘key’ to enter the host cell’s 
outer wall. This process is achieved by a protein 
on the virus’ surface called hemagglutinin (H or 
HA). Influenza viruses have sixteen (16) of these 
H proteins on their surface; so from the virus’ 
perspective, they have sixteen possible ‘keys’ to 
try upon the host cell’s outer wall. If the correct 
key is matched to the correct keyhole then 
the virus is allowed to open and pass through 
the cell’s outer wall. Once that happens, the 
invading virus hijacks the host cell’s replication 
system and makes thousands (to millions) of 
copies of itself, which usually results in the host 
cell’s death. When that process is complete, 
those new copies of the virus once again need 
to pass through the outer wall of the host 
cell; except this time they need to go from the 
inside of the cell to the outside of the cell. In 
order to achieve that, each virus has another 
set of surface proteins called neuraminidase 
(N or NA). Influenza viruses have nine (9) of 
these N proteins on their surface; so from their 
perspective they have nine possible keys to try 
from inside the host cell’s outer wall.8 
Antivirals work either by blocking some/
all of the sixteen H keyholes (hemagglutinin 
inhibitors) or by blocking some/all of the 
nine neuraminidase keyholes (neuraminidase 
inhibitors). This process helps to limit virus 
replication, thus lowering host cell infection. 
The current state stockpiles of Oseltamivir/
Tamiflu® and Zanamivir/Relenza® are good 
examples of neuraminidase inhibitors.9
Statin Medications
Most of us would recognize statins for their 
traditional role in lowering cholesterol in 
the bloodstream. However, statins also have 
both an anti-inflammatory and an immune-
modulatory effect. It is these additional 
benefits to statin use that authors like Fedson, 
Vandermeer, and Walsh discuss in relation to 
pandemic strain influenzas.10 Statins do not 
impact virus replication, yet they do help to 
suppress the body’s immune response. They 
are being explored as a potential treatment to 
ARDS.
Interferon Medications
Although interferons would technically be listed 
as antivirals, we have separated them from that 
class because of their unique mode of action. 
These naturally-occurring proteins are made 
and secreted by the cells of our body’s immune 
system. They come in three classes: alpha (used 
to treat cancers and viral infections); beta (used 
to treat multiple sclerosis); and gamma (used 
for treating chronic granulomatous disease). 
The mechanism of action of interferons is not 
well understood, but this class of medications 
helps to modulate the body’s immune system 
response to challenges from viruses, bacteria, 
cancers, and foreign substances that impact 
the body. Although interferon alphas do not 
directly kill viruses, they do help to boost the 
body’s immune system, and to prevent a hyper 
response by that system.11 Although interferon 
is more commonly discussed as a treatment 
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for diseases such as leukemia, AIDS-related 
Kaposi’s sarcoma, or chronic hepatitis B and 
C, there is also an extensive literature about 
using it to enhance the body’s immune system 
against pandemic strain influenzas, as well as 
novel HCo-Vs (specifically interferon-α2b).12
Corticosteroid Medications
This class of medication is similar to the natural 
hormones produced within our bodies that 
help to control many important functions such 
as blood sugar levels, salt levels, as well as our 
immune system’s function. These medications 
are often used to help treat diseases that cause 
inflammation, which novel viruses would most 
likely cause within the human lung following 
infection.13 This class of medication works by 
blocking substances within the human body 
that cause swelling. During the 2003/2004 
SARS epidemic corticosteroids (generally) 
fell out of favor with the medical community 
because they suppressed the entire immune 
system: both the good and the bad components 
of that system’s response.
Herbal / Alternative Medications
The literature often describes these 
medications as being “complementary” and 
“anti-inflammatory” in nature, with their 
effects primarily targeted on the host response 
rather than the virus replication. The Alleva et 
al. article includes a long list of Chinese herbs 
that are often described as ‘adjunct treatment 
therapies’ to antivirals.14  Although these herbal 
medications are not currently licensed within 
the U.S., they do warrant further research and 
analysis.
Comparison
In order to be considered for a state stockpile, 
a medication needs to have demonstrated 
a baseline medical efficacy in treating and 
handling medical complications associated 
with novel pandemic strain viruses. Table 
1 presents a summary of different therapy 
options discussed in the literature. The ‘Uses’ 
columns describe the different uses for each 
therapy.  The ‘Medical Efficacy’ columns 
provide a synopsis of the therapy’s expected 
medical impacts on patients ill with a pandemic 
strain virus.  The next two columns, The ‘Pros’ 
and ‘Cons,’ provide a brief summary of positive 
and negative aspects associated with the 
therapy as discussed in the literature. As with 
almost any medication, long term immunity 
is not imparted upon the patient (as would be 
achieved through immunizations); so this is a 
Con for all listed therapies.
Table 1: Comparison of Different Therapy Options
• Pros - Positive aspects associated with the medication as discussed in the citations
• Cons - Negative aspects associated with the medication as discussed in the citations
Mono-Therapy Class: Antivirals
Oseltamivir (neuraminidase inhibitor)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus Repli-
cations
•	 Already in national/state 
stockpiles
•	 Familiar to clinicians & 
public health
•	 Easily stored long term
•	 FDA licensed for influenza 
type A and B
•	 Possibly mismatched to virus 
strain
•	 Drug Resistance
•	 When used as prophylaxis, re-
peated regimens must be used
Citations - CDC15, Beigel, Bray16, Moscona17, Cooper et al.18, Treanor et al.19, Nicholson et al.20, Aoki et al.21, Salomon et 
al.22
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Relenza (neuraminidase inhibitor)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus Repli-
cations
•	 Already in national/state 
stockpiles
•	 Familiar to clinicians & 
public health
•	 Easily stored long term
•	 FDA licensed for influenza 
type A and B
•	 Mismatched to strain
•	 Drug Resistance
•	 When used as prophylaxis, re-
peated regimens must be used
Citations - CDC23, Moscona24, Hayden et al.25, Cooper et al.26, Makela et al.27, Salomon et al.28
Amantadine (adamantane drug)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Affordable
•	 Easily stored long-term
•	 Only approved for influenza type A
•	 Drug resistance problems
Citations - CDC29
Rimantadine (adamantane drug)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Affordable
•	 Easily stored long-term
•	 Only approved for influenza type A
•	 Drug resistance problems
Citations - CDC30
Ribavirin (nucleoside antimetabolite drug)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Experimental
•	 Easily stored long-term
•	 Generics Available
•	 Not in stockpiles
•	 New to public health
•	 Can induce anemia and/or toxicity 
issues
Citations - van Vonderen et al.31, Hayden32, Chan-Tack et al.33, Salomon et al.34
Mono-Therapy Class: Statins
Atorvastatin (Lipitor®), Rosuvastatin (Crestor®), Simvastatin (Zocor®), 
Gemfibrozil (Lopid®)
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Generics are affordable
•	 Readily accessible
•	 Familiar to care givers
•	 Not virus-strain specific
•	 Some key data linked to animal-
only studies
Citations - Fedson35, Walsh36, Kumaki et al.37
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Mono-Therapy Class: Interferons
Interferon-α2b   Intron-A
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Provide a treatment 
option if drug resistance 
issues to AVs arise
•	 Effective against a wide 
range of influenza viruses
•	 Expensive
•	 Cold chain issues
•	 Of the three types of interferons (alpha, 
beta, gamma) alpha primarily affects 
influenza viruses and beta affects HCo-
Vs
Citations - Cinatl et al.38, Katze et al.39
Interferon-α2b   PegIntron
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Provide a treatment 
option if drug resistance 
issues to AVs arise
•	 Effective against a wide 
range of viruses
•	 Expensive
•	 Cold chain issues
•	 Of the three types of interferons 
(alpha, beta, gamma) only alpha affects 
influenza viruses and HCo-Vs
Citations - Cinatl et al.40, Katze et al.41
Interferon-ß1a  Avonex
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Experimental
•	 Provide a treatment option 
if drug resistance issues to 
other AVs arise
•	 Effective against HCo-V
•	 Expensive
•	 Cold chain issues
•	 Of the three types of interferons 
(alpha, beta, gamma) beta impacts 
HCo-Vs
•	 Small sample size of studies
Citations - Hensley et al.42, Morgenstern et al.43
Interferon-ß1a  Rebif
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Experimental
•	 Provide a treatment 
option if drug resistance 
issues to other AVs arise
•	 Effective against HCo-V
•	 Expensive
•	 Cold chain issues
•	 Of the three types of interferons (alpha, 
beta, gamma) beta impacts HCo-Vs
•	 Small sample size of studies
Citations - Hensley et al.44, Morgenstern et al.45
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Mono-Therapy Class: Corticosteriods
Prednisone
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons





•	 Familiar to clinicians & 
public health
•	 Performed poorly against SARS
•	 Limited efficacy overall
Citations - Con:  Oba46, Pro: Bernard et al.47, Neutral: Stockman et al. 48
Mono-Therapy Class: Herbal Medicines
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Treatment •	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Experimental
•	 Useful adjunct treatments
•	 Targets the host response 
rather than the virus itself
•	 Not FDA approved
•	 Limited data
Citations - Alleva et al.49, Li et al.50
Combo-Therapy
Oseltamivir + Relenza
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment




•	 Already in national/state 
stockpiles
•	 Familiar to clinicians & 
public health
•	 Easily stored long term
•	 Possible drug resistance issues
•	 When used as an ongoing 
prophylaxis stockpiles are 
consumed quickly
•	 Animal models in many studies
Citations - Govorkova et al.51, Barik52
Oseltamivir + Ribavirin
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment




•	 Easily stored long term
•	 Limits virus replication, but has no 
impact on immune system’s response
•	 Ribavirin: causes hemolytic anemia 
in high doses, high toxicity, and has 
relatively small therapeutic index
Citations - Govorkova et al.53, Barik54
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Relenza + Ribavirin
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Experimental
•	 Synergistic effect •	 Limits virus replication, but has no 
impact on immune systems’ response
•	 Ribavirin: cause hemolytic anemia 
in high doses, high toxicity, and has 
relatively small therapeutic index
Citations - Govorkova et al.55, Barik56
Peramivir + Ribavirin
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Experimental
•	 Synergistic effect •	 Limits virus replication, but has no 
impact on immune systems’ response
•	 Peramivir is approved in Japan and 
Korea only
Citations - Govorkova et al.57
Amantadine + Ribavirin
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Experimental
•	 Enhanced inhibitory 
effect
•	 Synergistic effect
•	 Limits virus replication, but has no 
impact on immune system’s response
•	 Amantadine has been identified to have 
many drug resistance issues
Citations - Govorkova et al.58, Barik59
Antivirals + Statins
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications
•	 Lowers Immune 
Response
•	 Experimental
•	 Addresses virus 
replication issues 
and immune system 
hyper response issues 
concurrently
•	 Some AVs already in 
state/federal stockpiles
•	 Statins are easily 
accessible and familiar to 
clinicians
•	 Still being researched and tested
•	 Small sample size in some studies
•	 Statins are not in SNS/state stockpiles
Citations - Govorkova et al.60, Barik61
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Interferon-α2b + Ribavirin, PegIntron/Rebetol Combo Pack
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications




•	 Proven to have an  effect 
against novel viruses
•	 Provides another Tx 
option during pandemics
•	 Each component is 
commonly used in clinic 
settings
•	 Comes as an injectable medication only
•	 From SARS: “May improve outcome, 
but a definitive treatment regimen was 
not clearly established” (see Falzarano 
reference)
Citations - Falzarano et al.62
Interferon-α2b + Ribavirin, PegIntron/Rebetol Combo Pack
Uses Medical Efficacy Pros Cons
Prophylaxis
Treatment
•	 Decreases Virus 
Replications




•	 Proven to have an  effect 
against novel viruses
•	 Provides another Tx option 
during pandemics
•	 Each component is commonly 
used in clinic settings
•	 Comes as an injectable 
medication only
•	 From SARS: “May improve 
outcome, but a definitive 
treatment regimen was not 
clearly established” (see 
Falzarano reference)
Citations - Falzarano et al.63
Table 1 reveals many varying 
recommendations on whether/if these 
therapies should be used, and if so, whether as 
a treatment, as post-exposure prophylaxis, or 
as a combination of the two. Unfortunately, we 
cannot provide a measure of relative efficacy 
between these therapeutic options.  This is due 
to the fact that the source information on the 
medication efficacy comes from the evidence of 
their use gathered during prior pandemic strain 
illnesses and/or in laboratory or experimental 
settings.  This presents a two-fold issue: 1) a 
novel virus is by definition new, so we cannot 
be certain that the medications will provide the 
same benefits at the same levels as seen with 
existing viruses 2) there is no way to conduct 
comparative clinical trials of the medications 
so a true comparative efficacy cannot be 
established. The only two categories we will 
drop from further consideration are herbal 
remedies, as they are not FDA approved and 
there are no conclusive clinical studies on their 
efficacy, and Peramavir, as it is still in Phase II 
clinical trials in the US (and hence still several 
years from receiving FDA approval).  All of 
the medications that we consider in this paper 
have shown at least baseline levels of efficacy in 
treating influenza and pandemic strain viruses 
and their complications.
Stockpile Considerations
Given a basic level of potential medical 
efficacy, the remaining medications are further 
screened in Table 2 to determine whether 
or not they are viable candidates for a state 
stockpile. The three criteria we consider are 
additional medical considerations, cost, and 
logistical considerations. Additional medical 
considerations include two categories which 
indicate whether the medication is known 
to be kept in the strategic national stockpile 
(SNS) and whether the medication is familiar 
to physicians. If medications are known to be 
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already in the SNS, then states are much less 
likely to spend scarce resources on medications 
that already may  be obtainable from a federal 
source.  In addition, many states already have 
some of these medications on-hand in smaller 
scale stockpiles left over from the 2009/2010 
‘push’ of what the CDC released in preparation 
for the prolonged response to H1N1. Therefore, 
when we consider what the SNS already has 
in its inventory, matched with what states 
still have left over from H1N1, we assume that 
these medications would not be considered a 
good choice for a state stockpile.  In addition to 
these issues surrounding existing accessibility 
to stockpiled medications, we also consider 
whether or not physicians are familiar with 
these medications.  A strength of any stockpile 
would be not only its accessibility, but also 
its acceptability by clinicians to employ it.  If 
stockpiled medications are unfamiliar to 
caregivers, then they may be less likely to call 
on them in times of need.     
Since pandemics are, by definition, large in 
scale and wide-ranging, the amount of doses/
regimens that would need to be procured for 
a state stockpile will be substantial. Given the 
fiscal limitations that states face, compounded 
with declining federal funds provided through 
various public health preparedness grants, the 
medication procurement costs would need to 
be affordable. While there is no set definition 
of “affordable”, we chose to limit the price 
tag to a proposed recommendation of 1% of a 
state’s total public health preparedness (PHP) 
annual budget. This percentage was chosen 
based on what the Nevada PHP program 
has retrospectively been able to afford. This 
percentage may vary by state.
State PHP programs will need to rely on 
their existing climate controlled bulk-storage 
warehousing capabilities that were developed 
during the 2009/2010 HIN1 response. To be 
considered as a viable pharmaceutical therapy 
for a state stockpile, the medication must be 
capable of being stored in climate controlled 
facilities long-term, and must have no cold-
chain requirements.
Estimating Costs of 
Stockpile
While medical and logistical considerations 
are readily available online, the process to 
determine cost implications requires additional 
calculations and assumptions. It is important 
to highlight that these cost estimates are only 
rough estimates; more precise calculations 
would require exact treatment guidelines which 
will be developed only after the emergence of a 
specific novel virus.
To calculate the costs of a stockpile, we 
need to estimate two items: 1) the number of 
treatments that will be needed (i.e. how many 
people do we think may require treatment), and 
2) the amount of medication that may be used 
in an individual treatment (which provides the 
amount of medication needed to complete a 
full treatment course for a single individual). 
To estimate the number of treatments needed, 
we relied on the CDC website’s FluAid 2.0 
downloadable software to project a range (e.g., 
minimum (min), mean, and maximum (max)) 
of the number of individuals who will require 
treatment. The software provides three rates 
which can serve as a basis of the calculation: 1) 
the ‘Gross Attack Rate’ (GAR), which measures 
how many people will become clinically ill 
from a novel influenza virus (clinical illness is 
defined as a case that causes some measureable 
economic impact) 2) the ‘Hospitalization Rate’, 
which measures the number of people who fall 
clinically ill who would require hospitalization, 
and 3) the ‘Mortality Rate’, which measures 
the number of clinically ill patients who will 
lose their lives.64
While the GAR gives estimates of the total 
number of people who may fall ill from a novel 
virus, the range of ‘illness’ can span anything 
from ‘barely noticeable’ to ‘life threatening,’ 
and hence, it may include too large a segment 
of our population to be of any real use. The 
hospitalization rate calculation narrows our 
focus to those patients for whom we would be 
most interested in providing potentially life-
saving medications (i.e. to those who are ill 
enough to require hospitalization). This will be 
an underestimate of those seeking treatment, 
but given the limited response capabilities that 
Homeland Security Affairs, Volume 11 Article 7 (September 2015) WWW.HSAJ.ORG
Mackie & Richter,  Surviving the 'Storm'  11
we project, it would not be unreasonable to 
restrict treatment to this group. The mortality 
rate calculations are useful in that they describe 
to us how many people we stand to lose if we do 
nothing, but they are too narrow for treatment 
planning.  We would want/need to introduce 
these medications prior to knowing exactly 
which patients will succumb to the disease. An 
additional benefit of using the hospitalization 
rate as the basis for our calculations stems from 
the fact that it assumes that patients who will be 
treated will be in a clinical environment where 
potential intravenous drug therapies may be 
administered properly, if any such are found to 
be suitable for state stockpiles.65
Nevada has a total of 2,775,216 residents (as 
of October 1, 2013), with 766,414 of those falling 
within the 0-19 year old group, 1,656,765 in the 
20-64 year old group, and 352,038 in the 65+ 
group.66 These age groups were further split into 
high risk and non-high risk sub-groups using 
the Meltzer, Cox and Fukuda rates cited on the 
CDC’s FluAid 2.0 website.67 For the state of 
Nevada the software predicts the total number 
of hospitalizations to be 1,580 at minimum, 
with a mean of 4,970 and a maximum of 10,112 
hospitalizations. Similar calculations can be 
done for every state or region considering 
adding to its stockpiles. 
While the CDC FluAid 2.0 software used in 
the previous section is specific to pandemic 
influenzas, without any comparable estimating 
techniques for other viruses such as novel 
HCo-V, we chose to use these estimates as a 
basis for any potential novel viruses. 
To estimate the amount of medication 
needed in an individual treatment, we need to 
make some assumptions about the treatment 
regimen. Since we are considering strains of 
virus that may not yet even exist, we decided 
to use the standard multi-day therapy provided 
on the GoodRx website (www.goodrx.com). If 
the GoodRx website does not provide a specific 
multiday regimen, a generic ‘one pill/capsule 
per day for ten days’ treatment regimen is 
applied. 
We developed cost estimates for the min, 
mean, and max hospitalization rates for Nevada 
and the treatment regimens outlined above 
using the GoodRx website. 
Estimating State Funding 
Limits
For many states, including Nevada, their 
state and local PHP programs are completely 
funded by an aligned federal grant formed by 
the Hospital Preparedness Program (HPP) and 
the Public Health Emergency Preparedness 
(PHEP) cooperative agreement.68 The CDC 
publishes the amount of funding awarded to 
each state and territory.69 According to the 
CDC’s publication for Fiscal Year 2013, the 
state of Nevada receives approximately $9.7M 
in funding. The one percent funding limit for 
Nevada is therefore $97K.
Table 2 shows the additional medical 
considerations, the logistical considerations, 
and the cost considerations (based on Nevada’s 
estimated costs) for each of the treatment 
options identified in Table 1. The first column 
identifies whether or not the therapy is known 
to be in the SNS and whether the therapy is 
familiar to physicians.  The second column 
provides the cost associated with obtaining 
treatment to be able to handle the minimum, 
mean, and maximum estimated hospitalization 
rates.  The final column identifies whether or 
not the therapy can be contained in existing 
bulk storage facilities.  If the answer is “No”, 
this implies that the therapy requires cold 
chain storage (i.e. it must be continuously 
refrigerated).  The final row answers the 
question whether or not the specified therapy 
could be used to build a state-level stockpile. 
Examples of factors which would exclude a 
candidate therapy are: therapy is too expensive 
(e.g. more than one percent of the Nevada’s 
annual PHP budget), therapy requires cold 
chain (the state can only handle bulk storage in 
a climate controlled warehouse), and therapy is 
already included and widely available through 
the Strategic National Stockpile (SNS).
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Table 2: Candidate Therapy Selection (Using Nevada Cost Numbers)
Mono-Therapy Class: Antivirals
Oseltamivir (neuraminidase inhibitor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations






Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Relenza (neuraminidase inhibitor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations






Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Amantadine (adamantane drug)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile
Not familiar to Physicians
Min = $3K
Mean = $9K
Max  = $18K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Rimantadine (adamantane drug)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile
Not familiar to Physicians
Min = $45K
Mean = $141K
Max  = $286K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
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Ribavirin (nucleoside antimetabolite drug)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile





Recommendation: Good choice for State Stockpile
Mono-Therapy Class: Statins
Atorvastatin (Lipitor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations




Max  = $49K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Good choice for State Stockpile
Rosuvastatin (Crestor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations




Max  = $575K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Simvastatin (Zocor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations




Max  = $11K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Good choice for State Stockpile
Gemfibrozil (Lopid)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations




Max  = $22K
Bulk Storage Possible
Recommendation: Good choice for State Stockpile
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Mono-Therapy Class: Interferons
Interferon-α2b   Intron-A
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  not Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Interferon-α2b   PegIntron
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  not Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Interferon-ß1a  Avonex
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  not Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Interferon-ß1a  Rebif
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  not Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
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Mono-Therapy Class: Corticosteroids
Prednisone
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Combo-Therapy
Oseltamivir + Relenza
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Oseltamivir + Ribavirin
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Relenza + Ribavirin
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
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Amantadine + Ribavirin
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Combo-Therapy: Antivirals + Statins
Oseltamivir + Atorvastatin (Lipitor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Oseltamivir + Rosuvastatin (Crestor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Oseltamivir + Simvastatin (Zocor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Relenza + Gemfibrozil (Lopid)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations





Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
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Ribavirin + Atorvastatin (Lipitor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Ribavirin + Rosuvastatin (Crestor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Ribavirin + Simvastatin (Zocor)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Ribavirin + Gemfibrozil (Lopid)
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile




Bulk Storage  Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
Interferon-α2b + Ribavirin, PegIntron/Rebetol Combo Pack
Medical Considerations Cost Logistical Considerations
Not part of SNS Stockpile
Familiar to Physicians
Data not available on 
GoodRx website.  Likely 
to cost more than indi-
vidual PegIntron.
Bulk Storage  not Possible
Recommendation: Poor choice for State Stockpile
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Results
As seen in Table 2, the only family of therapies 
that is not considered viable for a state stockpile 
due to logistical considerations are the 
Interferons, because they all require cold-chain 
storage (i.e. the medication requires continuous 
refrigeration) and cannot be stored in existing 
bulk storage warehouses.  In terms of costs, 
Table 2 shows that the costs of medications 
can be much greater than 1% of a state’s federal 
grant formed by the Hospital Preparedness 
Program (HPP) and the Public Health 
Emergency Preparedness (PHEP) cooperative 
agreement.  For Nevada, the affordability limit 
is approximately $97,000.  Average stockpile 
costs of these medications for Nevada run from 
the cheapest ($9,000) to the most expensive 
($57,000,000).  Combination therapies, on-
patent medications, most antivirals and the 
interferons fall outside the affordability limit. 
In addition, there are several therapies listed 
in Table 2 that appear to be good choices for 
a state stockpile but are excluded because they 
are already included within the CDC’s SNS.70  
Of the remaining therapies, four were 
identified that met the cost consideration: 
ribavirin, atorvastatin, simvastatin, and 
gemfibrozil. 
Limitations
This research was limited by several issues, 
most notably by the fact that it is attempting 
to plan for a virus that does not yet exist. 
Although the references used in this research 
provide a glimpse into what the global public 
health community is discussing, they do not 
provide us with a definitive protocol on how to 
treat novel influenza and novel pandemic strain 
viruses. This research was also limited by a 
lack of knowledge of the full range of medical 
therapies available in the nation’s SNS. For 
security reasons the full list of what is included 
within the nation’s stockpiles is not published 
openly.  
The calculations shown here reflect only 
the Nevada resident population, and do not 
compensate for its additional population 
of visitors. Depending on the time of year, 
Nevada’s overall population can swell by nearly 
twenty percent with the tourist population (e.g. 
New Years’ Eve celebrations on the Las Vegas 
Strip, etc.). As an example for two of the state’s 
largest cities: tourism data report that nearly 
forty million visitors came to Las Vegas in 2012, 
and nearly 4.1 million visitors are expected 
to see Reno each year. Other preparedness 
planning options are being developed to handle 
this issue. 
We chose to use an online accessible (open 
source) pharmaceutical bulk price quoting 
website called GoodRx (www.goodrx.com). 
However, this is only a top-line estimate 
and is not fully reflective of what a health 
department may be able to negotiate if it did 
decide to proceed with a bulk purchase of 
medications.  In addition, we did not attempt 
to address the maintenance issues associated 
with a stockpile (drug rotation, detailed 
logistical considerations including floor space, 
etc.) because most states are maintaining a 
current stockpile of medications from the H1N1 
preparation and already have developed and 
implemented stockpile management plans.
Finally, influenza and MERs-CoV treatment 
is a vibrant, dynamic ever-changing research 
field. As new therapies become available, 
they will also need to be examined using the 
methodological framework developed in this 
paper.
Discussion
This research showed how expensive a potential 
state-level stockpile could become. Medical 
efficacy is not as significant a limiting factor 
as cost and logistical considerations. In this 
era of declining grant funds and an all-hazards 
approach, could/should these ‘few options’ 
even be considered as a possible investment in 
state-level prevention efforts?
An even bigger question is whether or not 
a state should carry an individual state-level 
stockpile.  We do not address this question 
in depth in this paper because many states 
already have a state-level stockpile due to the 
medications they received from the CDC (which 
allocated it from the SNS) in preparation for 
the H1N1 virus in 2009/2010.  Given that states 
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already have an existing stockpile, the next 
question is what it should include.  Given the 
existing US strategic stockpile, it is unlikely that 
states would wish to allocate scarce resources 
to duplicating an existing federal resource. 
However, this does expose states to some risk 
as the SNS is not large enough to provide every 
state all needed medications in the worst case 
scenario. Also, in a slowly growing pandemic, 
the last states affected may also find fewer 
medications available.  These scenarios are very 
unlikely. It is unclear what a state’s role should 
be in supplementing the known stockpile by 
duplicating medications. In this manuscript, 
we assumed that a state would not wish to 
duplicate the SNS and would only consider 
medications that may not already be included 
in the SNS to augment their treatment options. 
The following paragraphs discuss four options 
for supplementing an existing state stockpile to 
provide additional treatment options for novel 
influenza and pandemic strain viruses based on 
the analyses conducted in this paper.
One option would be to expand the 
current state stockpile to include three statins 
(atorvastatin, simvastatin, and gemfibrozil) 
that can help limit the body’s immune response 
within patients suffering from pandemic 
viruses.  The observed medical benefit of 
reducing a physiological response to infection is 
particularly appealing because it is independent 
of a specific virus strain. From a medical 
efficacy point-of-view they are appealing for 
the synergistic effect they have when used 
in tandem with antivirals existing in state 
stockpiles. Although the scientific explanations 
behind these synergistic effects are still being 
studied, the literature makes a strong case for 
the use of antivirals and statins administered 
together as a complementary treatment option. 
These recommended statins are appealing for 
other reasons as well: they are affordable at 
bulk rates (even if all three are purchased at the 
maximum levels, the total purchase cost would 
be under the 1% limit); they are well known 
to both the public and healthcare providers; 
and they are easily stored long-term in climate 
controlled warehouses. The major drawback is 
that they are not useful as prophylaxis, only as 
a treatment. From a state planning perspective, 
to have a set of affordable and complementary 
therapies that work independently of a specific 
virus strain would be a welcomed addition to a 
state-level stockpile.
A second option would be to expand the 
state’s existing stockpile of antivirals to include 
another, ribavirin, as well as adding statins. 
The research indicates that this additional 
antiviral therapy has significant medical 
efficacy when used as either a prophylaxis, or 
as a treatment. The research goes on to discuss 
the synergistic effect this medication has when 
used in conjunction with other antivirals (e.g. 
oseltamivir, relenza, etc.), as well as statins. 
While it would be possible to purchase the 
average levels of the three medications in a 
single purchase and remain below the 1% cut-
off, it is not possible to purchase the maximum 
level. To have another prophylaxis and/or 
treatment option, that complements what is 
already in state stockpiles, would be a force 
multiplier within a public health response to 
pandemic. 
Rather than purchase, maintain and rotate 
supplemental therapies within an existing state 
stockpile, a third option is for a state to create 
contracts with vendors that would be activated 
upon a pre-determined trigger. For example, 
a state may prepare a pre-written contract 
to purchase  a given quantity of therapy ‘A’ 
that would go into effect when a trigger (such 
as Stage 4, the first confirmed human case in 
North America). This option would provide a 
set of medical therapies that would expand the 
current list of options available to public health 
and clinical providers during a pandemic. 
The risk associated with this approach is the 
providers’ ability to deliver on the contracts 
during a pandemic when all contracts of 
this nature will come due at the same time. 
For a state such as Nevada, this is a serious 
consideration as any pandemic that reaches the 
state will most likely have affected California 
first – and the county of Los Angeles has five 
times the population of the state of Nevada.
Finally, a fourth option would be to do 
nothing and continue to rely on existing state 
stockpiles and projected SNS materials.
Since the successful completion of the 
2009/2010 response to the H1N1 pandemic, 
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many states have acquired and maintained 
state stockpiles of antiviral medications and 
PPE. As those same states prepare for future 
pandemics involving novel viruses, some state 
planners are looking to expand their current 
stockpiles to include more treatment and 
prophylaxis options. This manuscript identifies 
four such medications, an antiviral that could be 
used as a treatment option or as a prophylaxis 
option: ribavirin; and three statins that could 
be employed solely as treatment options: 
atorvastatin, simvastatin, and gemfibrozil. 
In planning for pandemics that would 
involve viruses that may not yet exist, this 
ability to expand state stockpiles with more 
treatment/prophylaxis options may be a sound 
investment. Nearly all prevention efforts come 
with some kind of cost, be they in money, time, 
or space; yet these recommended medical 
therapies are preventative efforts against 
some of the most dangerous threats posed to 
humanity: pandemics. Through this research 
we have attempted to open a dialogue with 
other federal and state planners as they wrestle 
with the same challenges within their home 
agencies.
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